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U.S. Preparation for ITU Conferences:
WARC '79, A Case Study
David B. Fenkell*
INTRODUCTION
In September 1979, 142 member nations of the International Telecom-
munication Union (ITU) sent more than 1,600 delegates, advisors, and
support staff, to Geneva, Switzerland, to convene the World Administra-
tive Radio Conference (WARC '79). 1 For the United States delegation 2 the
conference represented the culmination of over five years of prepara-
tion. 3 Most of the departments and agencies within the Executive Branch
were involved in the United States preparatory effort for WARC '79. The
Department of State, which had the responsibility of overseeing United
States preparation, coordinated recommendations submitted by the execu-
tive branch and the private sector. In particular, the State Department had
to weigh the private and public sector recommendations in formulating a
concise negotiating strategy. While this may appear to be an effective way
of organizing the preparatory effort, it in fact led to much confusion as the
roles of the various departments were ill defined.
This article traces United States preparation for international telecom-
munication conferences, focusing on WARC '79. First, a brief background
of the ITU is presented, including the events leading to the decision to
convene WARC '79. Secondly, with the aid of a recent Office of Technolo-
gy Assessment (OTA) Survey, 4 the article analyzes American preparation
for the Conference. The third part considers the impact of U.S. preparation
on the reservations taken at WARC '79. Finally, recent U.S. legislative
actions aimed at improving U.S. preparation for international telecom-
munication conferences are examined.
* David B. Fenkell is a member of the class of 1984, University of Michigan Law School.
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THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION
The International Telecommunication Union, formally organized in 1932,5
has become the center of international coordination and agreement for
international radio regulation. The International Telecommunication Con-
vention underscores the rights and obligations of the member states. The
most recent draft of the Convention is the product of the ITU Plenipotenti-
ary Conference of 1973 held in Malaga-Torremolinos, Spain. 6 The purpose
of the Union is:
(a) To maintain and extend international cooperation for the improve-
ment and national use of telecommunications of all kinds;
(b) To promote the development of technical facilities and their most
efficient operations with a view to improving the efficiency of tele-
communications service, increasing their usefulness and making
them, so far as possible, generally available to the public;
(c) To harmonize the actions of nations in the attainment of these
ends. 7
To accomplish these goals, the ITU is authorized to convene administra-
tive conferences in the forms of World Administrative Conferences and
Regional Administrative Conferences. Regional Administrative Confer-
ences consider only specific telecommunication matters and are limited in
discussion by their prearranged agenda. a The agenda of a World Adminis-
trative Conference, on the other hand, may include the drafting or revision
of Administrative Radio Regulations. 9
WARC '79
The initial impetus for WARC '79 can be found in Resolution 28 of the
ITU Plenipotentiary Conference held in 1973.10 Members of that Confer-
ence decided it was necessary to harmonize and update the Radio Regula-
tions because of recent technological advances in the field of
telecommunications and because the Radio Regulations had been amended
and revised on numerous occasions since the last WARC, held in 1959. 11
The ITU members approved the agenda of the 1979 World Administra-
tive Radio Conference in 1977 at the 32nd Session of the Administrative
Council. 12 The ten-week Conference was held in Geneva, Switzerland,
beginning September 24, 1979.13 Its main objectives were to review and
revise "the provisions of the radio regulations relating to terminology, the
allocation of frequency bands, and directly-associated regulations." 14 Fur-
thermore, all regulations relating to "the coordination, notification, and
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recording of frequency assignments" were to be revised if they pertained
to more than one service. 15
U.S. PREPARATION FOR WARC '79
United States preparation for WARC '79 pursued several broad objectives,
including maintaining flexibility to meet the needs of future telecommuni-
cations users, changing the radio regulations only when absolutely neces-
sary, and developing sound technical arguments to back U.S. proposals. 16
U.S. preparation was a highly integrated and complex event. 17 On the
domestic side, the preparatory effort was initiated in both government and
private sectors. In January 1974, the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA), 18 manager of the federal government
sector of telecommunications, had its Interdepartment Radio Advisory
Committee establish Ad Hoc Committee 144. This Committee included
representatives from all federal agencies with a major interest in telecom-
munication and spectrum use. Its purposes were to recommend the propos-
als of other organizations to the U.S. delegation to the conference and to
plan for and aid in the eventual domestic implementation of the Radio
Regulations (Geneva, 1979). 19
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is the Federal govern-
ment agency responsible for regulating the private sector use of telecom-
munication in the U.S. 20 In January 1975, the FCC sought private sector
input into the planning of WARC '79 through public proceedings and
Notices of Inquiry. 21 Several of the nine notices of inquiry dealt with
frequency allocations. 22/23 Though often faced with competing recom-
mendations, in December 1978 the FCC released to the State Department
its report containing proposals for commercial, private, and non-federal
government use of the spectrum. 24 This report and the NTIA recommen-
dations were synthesized and used by the State Department to formulate
the United States' final proposals to WARC '79.25
These reports, however, were by no means the only sources used by the
State Department. As early as 1977 the State Department, through its U.S.
embassies abroad, tried to determine the views and likely positions to be
taken at WARC '79 by other governments. This method of information
gathering proved inadequate because embassy personnel did not possess
the necessary expertise to fully discuss these highly technical matters. Also
many of the less developed countries did not formulate their proposals
until shortly before the conference convened. 26 To combat these
inadequacies, later in 1977 the U.S. began extensive bilateral discussions
with forty-eight foreign governments. 27 The purpose of these consulta-
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tions was to explain U.S. positions with respect to WARC '79 as well as
to obtain information on foreign positions. 28
Domestically, in 1978 the State Department established a Public Advi-
sory Committee to allow private sector input into the final proposals for
WARC '79. The purpose of the Advisory Committee was to afford the
State Department and the head of the WARC '79 delegation a means of
obtaining private sector input into U.S. positions to be taken at WARC '79,
as well as to develop U.S. negotiating strategy. 29 Both members and non-
members of the WARC delegation criticized the role of the private sec-
tor. 30
In addition to the consultations described above, the United States also
participated in several multilateral discussions. The U.S. attended three
preparatory seminars held by the ITU. 31 With respect to proposals affect-
ing the military, the U.S. coordinated all decisions through NATO's Allied
Radio Frequency Agency.
In January 1978, Glenn 0. Robinson was named head of the U.S. delega-
tion to WARC '79 32 and was given the position of Ambassador for the
duration of the conference, reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary of
State. In April 1978, an initial delegation of twenty was chosen from
federal agencies active in the preparatory effort of WARC '79. Subsequent-
ly, a full delegation of sixty-seven members 33 and approximately forty
support staff members was chosen. 34
Of the sixty-seven delegates chosen, nine represented particular private
corporations. 35 There has been an ongoing debate, both before and after
WARC '79, concerning the use of the private sector in ITU activities, with
some critics arguing that ITU delegates chosen from the private sector
receive unfair advantages from their appointment. 36 To counter these
criticisms, the State Department adopted new guidelines limiting the use
of private sector delegates to international conferences; 37 although late in
the preparation effort it was decided to exempt WARC '79.38 This exemp-
tion, however, had little impact because most of the preparation was
already complete and most of the delegates had already been chosen. The
belatedness of the exemption presumably accounts for the low percentage
of private sector delegates to WARC '79.
Because the OTA sent a questionnaire to members of the WARC '79
delegation and to government and private industry personnel involved in
the preparatory effort requesting their evaluation, 3 9 the Office of Tech-
nology Assessment's Survey on WARC '79 Preparations and Impacts 40
offers an excellent device by which to evaluate the U.S. preparation. A total
of 104 (62 percent) of the questionnaires were completed and returned. 41
The most striking conclusion to be drawn from the survey is the failure
of the United States to capitalize on the expertise acquired by the federal
government delegates to ITU conferences. This failure is manifested both
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in the assessments of past conferences and in the United States' method
of preparing and selecting delegates to future conferences.
Analysis of the survey results indicates that both the delegates chosen
to ITU conferences and the non-delegates active in the preparation effort
have failed to remain active in later ITU activities. Only 9 percent of the
responding delegates participated in the 1973 ITU Plenipoteniary and only
32 percent of the responding delegation were involved in WARC '77.42
Similar results are found in the data concerning non-delegates. 43 Because
of the demanding schedule of future ITU conferences, this finding may be
significant. The survey indicates that an immense amount of time and
money went into WARC '79 preparation. 44 If there was a permanent
group of delegates or a delegate pool, the time necessary for the prepara-
tion of these conferences could be greatly decreased. The result would be
better U.S. preparation and organization at future ITU conferences, as well
as a consistency in U.S. negotiating positions from one conference to the
next.
A second conclusion apparent from the survey is that the respondents
used certain sources to prepare for WARC '79 and other sources to evaluate
its results. Respondents relied heavily on FCC Notices of Inquiry, materials
published by the NTIA, meetings of government sponsored advisory
groups, and State Department materials in their preparation for WARC
'79. In contrast, respondents relied little or not at all on FCC reports, NTIA
reports, and State Department reports for learning about the results of the
conference. ITU materials were the only source respondents used both to
prepare for and to evaluate the results. Part of the preference for ITU
materials may be explained by the fact that the Final Acts of WARC '79
were included in the survey under ITU materials. 45 The inconsistency
may, however, indicate that the State Department fails adequately to
create a mechanism with which to analyze its international regulatory
conferences. This finding would be consistent with the conclusion that the
State Department fails to utilize past conference delegates and support
staff in assessing ITU conferences.
Over 70 percent of the delegates chosen to WARC '79 were from within
the Federal government. 46 These delegates provide an accessible, inexpen-
sive source for evaluating U.S. performance at ITU conferences. Yet the
OTA Survey indicates that the State Department, in assessing ITU confer-
ences, places little reliance on reports by the FCC, NTIA or itself and
instead relies predominantly on ITU materials. As the need for extensive
preparation and uniformity of position increases, especially in light of the
rigorous FTU conference schedule, 47 this conclusion may prove significant.
The respondents stated that the U.S. preparatory effort had two impor-
tant goals: first, selecting the most effective delegation, and second, select-
ing a negotiating strategy that would facilitate acceptance of U.S.
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positions. 48 Approximately half of all respondents felt the U.S. preparato-
ry effort was only moderately effective in obtaining these goals. In con-
trast, approximately one third of the respondents felt U.S. preparation for
WARC '79 was low or ineffective. The only area where respondents found
preparations highly effective was in allowing for an equal hearing of all
knowledgeable viewpoints. 49
As the OTA Survey indicates, there is a direct relationship between U.S.
preparation for and effectiveness at ITU conferences. U.S. preparatory
action, such as the bilateral meetings with ITU members scheduled prior
to ITU conferences, provide a valuable tool for developing a realistic nego-
tiating strategy. However, as the results of the OTA Survey indicate, the
U.S. preparatory effort for ITU conferences can be strengthened in several
areas. First, the State Department, as coordinating body, must better utilize
the experience gained by U.S. delegates selected to ITU conferences. This
could take the form of having these delegates draft reports evaluating past
conferences or assessing our position at future conferences. Second, in the
past little reliance has been placed on Executive Branch reports for assess-
ing ITU conferences, despite the fact that these reports provide a valuable
means of gaining the viewpoint of all areas within the Executive Branch.
This input is essential in formulating a coordinated negotiating strategy for
future conferences. The growing importance to the United States of such
a coordinated negotiating strategy can be appreciated by surveying the
results of WARC '79.
RESULTS OF WARC '79
Not only was WARC '79 the largest conference ever held under the aus-
pices of the ITU, but it was also the largest intergovernmental conference
ever to concentrate on telecommunications. 5 0 The Final Acts of WARC '79
incorporate the Radio Regulations (Geneva, 1979) and Final Protocol. 51
The consensus is that the results of WARC '79 will cause "no immediate
change in operations using the radio spectrum or geostationary satellite
orbit." 5 2 However, there was a loss of U.S. flexibility in certain spectrum
areas. National defense is one such area. As was stated by a spokesman for
the NTIA during the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Public Hearings
on the Radio Regulations (Geneva, 1979) and Final Protocol, "U.S. propos-
als concerning radio services with a military or defense connotation
...were the least popular and the hardest for which to obtain wide
support." 53 This loss of flexibility may in part explain the greater use by
the United States of reservations, recommendations, and resolutions at
WARC '79 than at previous ITU conferences. To evaluate properly the
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effectiveness of preparation for WARC '79 it is necessary to understand
the specific reservations taken to the Final Acts.
U.S. RESERVATIONS TAKEN AT WARC '79
The ITU Convention clearly grants a member nation the power to make
a reservation 5 4 with respect to any revision of the Radio Regulations. 55 By
using a reservation, a member state of the ITU can accept the majority of
the regulations concluded at a WARC without being bound by a specific
regulation. 
5 6
In past ITU conferences, the U.S. has taken a position of compromise
rather than conflict. 57 In fact, this reluctance to take a reservation to a
particular regulation has impaired U.S. negotiating strength. 58 However,
at WARC '79, this strategy appeared to change with the U.S. taking six
reservations to the Final Acts.
Three of the six reservations can be classified as political rebuttal state-
ments. 5 9 Although the ITU may not be the best forum to settle these
political issues, with the growing discussion of political issues within
primarily non-political organizations, the discussion of these issues within
the ITU seems inevitable. Since these political issues will be discussed and
negotiated in various forums, a concise uniform position is necessary for
a strong U.S. negotiating position. This strength can only be gained
through positive interaction among all the departments of the executive
Branch. The logical starting point for the formulation of a negotiating
strategy on these issues is in the U.S. preparatory effort to ITU activities. 60
The first such rebuttal statement used by the United States was in
response to a Cuban complaint that the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo
was interfering with Cuba's communication service and encroaching upon
Cuban sovereignty. The U.S. position was that it would continue to meet
its communication requirements in the area, regardless of any impact on
Cuba. 61
The second reservation dealt with the issue of sovereignty over the
geostationary orbit. 62 Prior to the conclusion of WARC '79, Colombia,
along with seven other equatorial countries and Indonesia, submitted
protocol statements reasserting sovereign claims over the geostationary
orbit above their respective territories. The U.S. and twenty-two other
nations submitted Protocol Statement No. 75, which denied these claims
of sovereignty over the geostationary orbit and further stated that the
claims of equatorial countries to sovereignty over segments of the geosta-
tionary orbit cannot be recognized by the Conference. 63 This issue will
resurface in 1984 when the first session of the World Administration Radio
326 REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS
Conference on the Geostationary Orbit and the Planning of Space Service
convenes. 64 Thus on-going U.S. preparation in this area is critical.
The third reservation taken by the U.S. at WARC '79, while not a
political rebuttal statement by definition, was political in nature. The con-
ference members were silent on the issue of the intentional jamming of
radio frequencies, except for Israel in a statement attached to the Final
Acts. 6 5 Thus to put the jamming issue on record and in an attempt to raise
the problem of intentional jamming of U.S. broadcasts in Eastern Europe,
the U.S. submitted Protocol Statement No. 39.66 Through the use of this
protocol statement, the U.S. made clear that "it reserves the right with
respect to such interference to take necessary and appropriate action to
protect its broadcasting interests." 67 None of the Communist bloc coun-
tries responded to the U.S. statement.
The second group of reservations taken by the U.S. at WARC '79 dealt
with highly technical spectrum matters. Analysis of the effects these reser-
vations will have on the U.S. has been sparse. One factor which may
explain this silence is that the issues raised by these reservations, in many
instances, directly affect U.S. national security. Also, since any effect these
reservations will have on the U.S. will not occur immediately and since
discussion of these issues is certain to resurface at future ITU conferences,
perhaps serious analysis of these reservations is premature.
Regardless of the reason for the lack of discussion concerning them, the
importance these reservations play with respect to U.S. preparation for ITU
activities must not be ignored. In fact, the various factors leading to their
lack of discussion, as enumerated above, only highlight the necessity of
U.S. preparation in this area. For the U.S. to be perceived as having a strong
negotiating position, it is imperative that it not vacillate between positions
on spectrum issues. As with political rebuttal statements, this can only be
accomplished through coordinated interaction among all departments of
the Executive Branch. 68 These issues are sure to be discussed at future ITU
conferences as well as in bilateral telecommunication negotiations. Greater
preparation for ITU functions can only lead to a greater understanding of
these technical issues which can be used to strengthen the U.S. negotiating
position regardless of the forum of discussion.
Because preparation for telecommunication conferences is coordinated
by the State Department, and because of the extensive schedule of future
ITU conferences, preparation in this area could act as a focal point for U.S.
strategy development. All departments of the executive branch can benefit
from the bilateral negotiations such as those used in preparing for WARC
'79.69 These negotiations should become a mainstay of U.S. preparation
for ITU activities.
A discussion of each of three reservations which dealt with technical
spectrum matters follows. While the effect these reservations will have on
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the U.S. cannot be fully known, it is possible to gain an understanding of
why they were taken. This is the first step in developing a strong negotiat-
ing position.
The first reservation to deal directly with spectrum matters and to affect
U.S. national security was Protocol Statement No. 32.70 One U.S. objective
at WARC '79 was to maintain the current status of the Mobil Satellite
Service (MSS) located in the band used for U.S. Naval Fleet satellite com-
munications. The regulations adopted at WARC '79 added coordination
provisions to the MSS's operating within this band. 71 These provisions
included a condition that stations in the MSS not cause harmful interfer-
ence to these or other services operating, or planned to be operated, in
accordance with the table of allocations. 72 The U.S. and other NATO
members expressed concern that this condition could lead other nations
planning satellite systems which might be subject to interference by a MSS
already operating in this band to use this possibility to make spurious
requests that the MSS's cease operations. Through Protocol Statement No.
32, the NATO countries stated that "such a condition is unacceptable." 
73
Through the use of HF (shortwave) broadcasting, nations have been
able to send news, entertainment, and propaganda to audiences through-
out the world. These broadcasts have been hampered by the increased use
of the allocated spectrums as well as by the intentional blocking of broad-
cast signals. The U.S. delegation to WARC '79 intended to expand the
frequency allocations for international broadcasting, maritime, and ama-
teur services. There was concern that this expansion would result in a loss
of HF spectrum availability for Department of Defense purposes. 
74
As a result of the conference, there was a 14 percent net reduction in
HF spectrum availability for Department of Defense purposes. Because the
Department depends largely on satellites, it did not assess this reduction
as critical. 75 However, the U.S., along with seven other nations, did make
a reservation pertaining to the allocation of the HF band. It was the consen-
sus of these nations that the failure adequately to allocate the HF bands
for broadcasting would hamper the HF Broadcasting Conference sched-
uled for 1984 and 1986. Thus, these nations, through Protocol Statement
No. 36, reserved their right to take the necessary steps to meet the needs
of their HF broadcasting services. 76
Protocol statement No. 3877 incorporates all .the major reservations
taken at WARC '79 by the United States. 78 The thrust of this reservation
dealt with radiolocation 79 and appears in effect to state that the U.S. will
not compromise national security regardless of the outcome of WARC '79.
The United States stated that it could not guarantee protection to or coor-
dination with other services that were subject to interference from "the
operation of stations in the radiolocation service on a primary basis." 80
The United States also expressed the view that it would not be bound to
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the coordination procedures for the operation of fixed, mobile and radiolo-
cation services in certain bands. The United States did agree that it would
"coordinate its usage of such services with neighboring administrations
which are affected." 81
The last paragraph of this reservation manifested the American percep-
tion that the conference failed to provide adequate allocations for the HF
maritime mobile service, particularly below 12 MHZ. 82 The United States
indicated that it would satisfy its maritime mobile needs in the HF bands
below 10 MHZ through the use of allocations to the mobile service on a
primary basis.
The reservations made at WARC '79 have clearly played a part in
determining the Senate's reluctance to give its advice and consent to the
ratification of the Radio Regulations (Geneva, 1979). However, an addi-
tional factor considered by the Senate was U.S. preparation for interna-
tional telecommunication conferences, particularly the policy coordination
with the executive branch.
EFFECT OF U.S. PREPARATION ON RATIFICATION OF THE
RADIO REGULATIONS (GENEVA, 1979)
The major source of opposition to prompt ratification of the Radio Regula-
tions was from former Senator Harrison Schmitt of New Mexico. Senator
Schmitt took the position that the uniformity and certainty in the table of
allocations necessary to carry out effective planning of telecommunication
needs was not accomplished by WARC '79.83 Senator Schmitt also felt
that ongoing weaknesses within the executive branch have kept the United
States from developing a strong negotiating strategy. Three of the funda-
mental weaknesses he saw are:
(1) Top decision-making levels of the Federal government and private
industry fail to appreciate the vital role of telecommunications;
(2) Centralized policy coordination and guidance for international
telecommunications negotiations are not undertaken at a high
enough level in federal government to be effective; and
(3) The State Department's Office of International Communications
Policy is neither staffed nor organized to carry out its function
effectively. 8
4
Senator Schmitt concluded that while there has been an attempt to im-
prove coordination with the State Department, the executive branch still
lacked a focal point for policy coordination. 8 5 To remedy the lack of
coordinated policy development within the executive branch, the Senate
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has provided for a study of the long-range telecommunications and infor-
mation goals of the United States. 86
Senator Schmitt successfully proposed that a Senate declaration be in-
cluded in the Senate's advice and consent to ratification of the Radio
Regulations. 87 This declaration calls for a "coordination mechanism that
will ensure the systematic development of international telecommunica-
tions policy" 88 within the executive branch and for the revision and cla-
rification of Executive Order 12046 which created the NTIA. In the
Senate's view, the language of this Executive Order has led to a confusion
of roles between the NTIA, the FCC and the Department of State. 89
CONCLUSION
It appears that with the Senate's consideration of the Radio Regulations
(Geneva, 1979) the importance of preparation for international telecom-
munication conferences has been recognized. Specifically, the Senate has
made its advice and consent to ratification contingent upon the reorganiza-
tion within the Executive Branch of the preparatory mechanism for inter-
national telecommunication conferences. The United States can no longer
be content with the confusion which exists within the executive branch
in formulating American negotiating strategy. Fortunately, the first step
toward a strong and effective negotiating strategy has been taken.
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International Radio Regulations, 70 F.C.C.2d 1193, 1194-96 (1978)[hereinafter cited as FCC
Inquiry ].
22/23 Id.
24 FCC Inquiry, supra note 21.
25 The formal U.S. proposals are contained in ITU-WARC Doc. Nos. 40-50; see also
Robinson, 77te US. Faces WARC: The US. Posilion, 29 J. Com.
26 For a different view of the value of the embassies as an information gathering source,
see DELEGATE REVoaT, supra note 1, at 6: "In early 1977, the Department initiated a worldwide
effort through its overseas posts to obtain foreign views and other details regarding prepara-
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tion for the 1979 WARC. Replies from Embassies provided an invaluable source of informa-
tion on foreign positions."
27 These bilateral discussions were usually conducted in the following manner: small
teams of U.S. experts would visit foreign capitals and carry on "face-to-face, one-on-one"
consultations with the appropriate foreign officials. Id. at 7. The countries visited were:
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, People's Republic of China,
Colombia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Morocco, Mexico, Ni-
geria, Norway, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, the Netherlands, Republic of Korea, Ivory
Coast, Denmark, Egypt, Spain, France, China, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy,
Peru, Philippines, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Sudan, Switzerland,
Turkey, the U.S.S.R., Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, and Zaire. Id. at 7-8.
28 For a treatment of the use of these bilateral discussions in preparation for future ITU
Conferences, see WARC '79 Hearings, supra note 1, at 48-49 (State Department's responses to
additional questions submitted for the record).
29 OTA SuRvEY, supra note 4, at 88.
30 For a discussion of the effectiveness of the private sector in preparing for and participat-
ing in WARC '79, see WARC '79 Hearings, supra note 1, at 45-46 (State Department's responses
to additional questions submitted for the record). The State Department concluded:
In summary, there is clearly a role for public interest group representation on delega-
tions to conferences such as WARC-79; however, their effectiveness depends primari-
ly on their individual interest and qualification with respect to the issues. Earlier
participation in the preparatory process, particularly the FCC activities which are
directed to all non-governmental interests would enhance their usefulness. The inclu-
sion of public representatives on U.S. delegations will be considered for upcoming
conferences whenever their participation would be appropriate.
Id. at 46. For a different view of public interest group representation, see OTA Suzvy,
supra note 4, at 62 ("Adding representatives to the delegation with no apparent role
other than to fulfill some nonspecific requirement to include special interest, racial or
sexual representation proved to be frustrating for all concerned with no apparent
benefits.").
31 These seminars were held in Nairobi, Panama, and Sydney. The U.S. intended to use
the seminars to establish bilateral contacts with as many participants as possible, and in
particular, with persons from countries not visited. DELEGATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
32 Mr. Robinson is a former F.C.C. Commissioner and is currently a professor of law at
the University of Virginia.
33 TABLE 2. U.S. DELEGATES To WARC '79 BY ORGANIZATION
No.of %Of
Organizational affilation delegates delegates
Federal Government
F.C.C ............................. 18 26.5%
NTIA (and other Commerce Dept.) ........ 8 12
Dept. of Defense ........................... 6 9
Dept. of State .............................. 6 9
NASA* ................................... 4 6
International Communications
Agency. ........................ 2 3
Dept. of Transportation ................ 2 3
Nat'l. Science Foundation .............. .... 1 1.5
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No. of %of
Organizational affliation delegates delegates
Office of Science and Tech- . .............
nology (White House) ............... .... .1 1.5
TOTAL .......................... 48 71.5%
Private Corporations
COMSAT ......................... 3 4.5%
AT&T ................................... 1 1.5
Hughes Aircraft ..................... 1 1.5
Rockwell International ................ ..... 1 1.5
Satellite Business Systems .............. 1 1.5
Western Union ......................... ...1 1.5
TOTAL .......................... 9 12%
Industry associations ........................ 3 4.5%
All other .......................... 7 10.5
Error due to computational averaging ...... - 1.5
TOTAL ................................. 67 100 %
* Includes Systematics General Corp. representatives
** Includes Board of International Broadcasting
OTA SURVEY, supra note 4, at 60. For a discussion of the possible conflict of interest of
industry experts acting as U.S. delegates, see id. at 60-63 and infra text accompanying notes
36-37.
34 For a complete list of U.S. delegates and support staff to WARC '79, see DELEGATE
REPORT, supra note 1, at B1-14.
35 See Table, supra note 33.
36 Critics in the private sector were concerned that companies with private representatives
named to the delegation would be in a better position to advocate their own proposals to the
FCC as their delegates would have access to special information which unrepresented compa-
nies taking conflicting positions might not have. OTA SURvEY, supra note 4, at 61.
37 Id. at 60.
38 International Communications Agency Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-60, 93 Stat.
395 (1979)..
39 One hundred and sixty-eight respondents were selected for the OTA survey from
various lists of individuals involved in international spectrum management. For a complete
list of respondents, see OTA SURVEY, supra note 4, at 464.
40 See id.
41 Id. at 1.
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42 Id. at 3.
43 Only 15 percent of the respondents who had not been delegates participated in the 1973
I.T.U. Plenipotentiary Meeting and only 28 percent were involved with WARC '77. Id. at 3.
44 Of the delegates who responded to the survey, 20-1/2 percent stated that they devoted
between six months and one year to WARC '79 preparation while 54-1/2 percent stated that
they spent more than one year preparing for WARC '79. However, only 36 percent of
non-delegate government personnel spent more than six months preparing for WARC '79,
with only 12 percent of the non-delegate private industry personnel spending more than one
year on WARC '79 preparation. Id. at 4.
45 Id. at 6 & 18.
46 See Table, supra note 33.
47 For the first time, a WARC agenda called for the setting of a schedule for convening
future administrative radio conferences. See ITU, WORLD ADMINISTRATIVE RADIO CONFERENCE
(1979), reprinted in PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS TRANSMITTING THE RADIO REGULATIONS (GENE-
VA, 1979) AND FINAL PROTOCOL, S. TREATY Doc. No. 97-21, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 859 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as FINAL ACrs].
To some of the conference participants, this was seen as a necessity since under the
WARC '79 agenda the conference did not have the authority to carry out planning and review
of the general mobile service provisions or to deal with other aspects of the radio regulations.
To the majority, this provision was seen to be too great a burden on the ITU and its members.
As stated in the public hearings, it is the position of the U.S. Department of State that
with regard to failures of the conference, probably the most significant one relates to
the future conferences program recommended by WARC '79. Each conference by itself
responded to the needs and desires of a large segment of the ITU, buttogether, they
resulted in an extremely heavy burden on the limited resources of the Union and
individual administrations.
WARC '79 HEARINGS, supra note 1, at 49.
The Schedule is summarized in Recommendation No. 12. See id. at 859.
48 OTA SURVEY, supra note 4, at 15.
49 Id. at 14. To fully comprehend the results of the OTA Survey, interviews as opposed
to questionnaires would have to be conducted with certain respondents. Such interviews were
conducted but at the date of this writing were unavailable for review.
50 Robinson, Regulating International Airwaves: The 1979 WARC, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 12 (1980).
51 FINAL ACTS, supra note 47. On November 24, 1981, the President of the United States
transmitted the Radio Regulations (Geneva 1979) and Final Protocol to the United States
Senate for advice and consent to ratification. It was the President's hope that the Senate would
give its advice and consent before January 1, 1982, the date on which the regulations went
into force for approving governments. Id. at iii. Ratification by the U.S. prior to that date
would have been a sign of goodwill and determination by the U.S. to abide by ITU agree-
ments.
Early consent to ratification did not occur. In fact, public hearings before the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate did not take place until May 18, 1982, five and a half
months after the regulations entered into force for approving governments. As evidenced in
the record of the hearing, there did not appear to be opposition to prompt ratification of the
regulations by the Department of Defense, the NTIA, the FCC, or the private sector. WARC
'79 Hearings, supra note 1, at 2, 3, 7, 33, and 38. The statement of the Department of Defense
representative was only fifteen lines of text. Id. at 26-27. This seems unusual considering the
great impact the Radio Regulations are likely to have on national defense programs.
On September 21, 1982, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations recommended that
the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification of the Radio Regulations with the
proviso, "that in the implementation of this treaty for the United States, the introduction of
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a Direct Broadcasting Satellite Service into the 12.2-12.7 GHz band shall be carried out in
a manner which minimizes unreasonable disruptions to existing uses in that band." S. Rep.
No. 61, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1982). This proviso responded to the concern of private
industry representatives that new direct broadcast satellite services would interrupt terrestrial
fixed microwave communications in the 12.2-12.7 GHz.
52 OTA SURVEY, supra note 4, at 11.
53 WARC '79 Hearings, supra note 1, at 6. (Statement of Donald M. Jansky, Associate
Administrator for Federal Systems and Spectrum Management, NTIA, Department of Com-
merce).
54 Malaga-Torremolinos Convention, supra note 6, at Chapter Xl art. 77(17). One of the
goals of a World Administrative Radio Conference is to draft radio regulations in a way which
is most satisfactory to the participating nations. A means to this end is the use of reservations,
footnotes, and recommendations. Thus, at WARC '79, some countries in effect stated that
they would interpret parts of the regulations as they chose and might not be bound by specific
regulations at all.
55 The use of reservations at WARC '79 has been discussed by Mr. Robinson, head of
the U.S. delegation, whose view is that the use of a reservation "leaves the country free to
pursue its own use of the spectrum independent of other countries, but it does not give it
the international recognition or protection which may be necessary for effective utilization
of the frequencies." Robinson, supra note 50, at 35.
56 A nation may also avoid being bound by a majority decision of a WARC by using a
footnote. A nation may not use a footnote unless other members approve it by vote. The use
of footnotes at WARC '79 allowed member nations to state for the record that it intended
to extend frequency use beyond that agreed to or that it is specifying a particular use as
primary or secondary. OTA SURvEY, supra note 4, at 52.
57 Before WARC '79, the most recent major U.S. reservation dealing with radio communi-
cations was at the 1974 Maritime WARC. In early ITU conferences, however, the U.S. failed
to reach compromises. For example, in 1950 the U.S. refused to.sign the Final Acts of the
WARC held in Mexico City.
58 "[I]n my experience as a U.S. delegate to numerous ITU conferences during the past
several years, I can recall that there was a time when the United States was very reluctant
and, as a matter of fact, would not take a reservation. I also noted that knowledge of this
tendency worked to our disadvantage because other administrations, knowing that, would
keep pushing for agreement." WARC '79 Hearings, supra note 1, at 39 (Statement of E. Merle
Glunt, Consultant, American Radio Relay League).
59 Political rebuttal statements are those made to counteract political rhetoric aired at the
Conference. See OTA SuRvEY, supra note 4, at 100.
60 This conclusion is drawn from primarily two factors. First, as stated supra text accom-
panying note 46, over 70 percent of the delegates to WARC '79 came from within the federal
government. Thus, in light of the future schedule of ITU conferences, see infra note 68,
preparation for these conferences will force interaction within the executive branch. Absent
the scheduled ITU conferences this result is not ensured.
61 The United States countered the Cuban allegations with the following statement:
"With reference to statement No. 9 by the Government of the Republic of Cuba, the Govern-
ment of the United States of America notes that the United States presence in Guantanamo
is by virtue of a treaty in force; the United States reserves the right to meet its radiocommuni-
cation requirements there as heretofore." Protocol Statement No. 72, FiNAL AcTs, supra note
47, at 737.
62 The geostationary satellite orbit is the orbit in which a satellite must be placed to be
a geosynchronous satellite whose circular and direct orbit lies in the plane of the Earth's
equator and which thus remains fixed relative to the Earth.
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63 Protocol Statement No. 75, FiNAL ACTS, supra note 47, at 738.
64 Future conferences planned by WARC '79 are summarized in Recommendation XM,
FiNAL Acts, supra note 47, at 859. The conferences, and the resolutions recommending them,
include: WARC for the Mobil Service (Resolution DH); WARC for Planning of the HF
Broadcasting Bands (Resolution DI); WARC on the Use of the Geostationary Satellite Orbit
and the planning of Space Services Utilizing It-two sessions (Resolution BP); Region 2
Broadcasting Satellite Planning Conference (Resolution CH); Planning Conference for Sound
Broadcasting in the Band 87.5--108 MHz for Region 1 and certain countries in Region 3
(Resolution BM); Regions 1 and 3 Conference for Planning Feeder Links to Broadcasting
Satellites in the 12 GHz Band (Resolution BQ); Region 3 Conference to Establish Sharing
Criteria for the Use of VHF and UHF Bands (Resolution DK); Conference to Revise the Plan
of the Copenhagen Convention (1948) for the European Maritime Area (Recommendation
YD); Conference Concerning the Provisions of the African VHG/UHF Broadcasting Confer-
ence, Geneva, 1963 (Resolution CQ); Region 2 Planning Conference for Broadcasting in the
Band 1605-1705 kHz (Recommendation YC); and WARC Concerning the Frequency Allot-
ment Plan of the Aeronautical Mobil (OR) Service (Recommendation YF).
65 Protocol Statement No. 30, FNA AcTs, supra note 47, at 729.
66 The U.S. Delegation, upon instructions from the Department of State, submitted a
statement for the record regarding intentional jamming of international broadcasts in the high
frequency bands. The text of the reservation is as follows:
The administration of the United States of America, calling attention to the fact that
some of its broadcasting in the high frequency bands allocated to the broadcasting
service are subject to willful harmful interference by administrations that are signatory
to these Final Acts, and that such interference is incompatible with the rational and
equitable use of these bands, declares that for as long as this interference exists, it
reserves the right with respect to such interference to take necessary and appropriate
actions to protect its broadcasting interests. In so doing, however, it intends to respect
the rights, to the extent practicable, of administrations operating in accordance with
these Final Acts.
Protocol Statement No. 39, at 731.
67 Id.
68 71.5 percent of the delegates to WARC '79 came from the executive branch. See Table,
supra note 33.
69 See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
70 The joint statement by NATO countries regarding the operation of mobile satellite
systems in the band 235-399.9 MHz is as follows:
The above-mentioned administrations (Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Den-
mark, the United States, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and Turkey) reserve their right to operate
systems in the mobile satellite service in the frequency range 235-399.9 MHz under
the provisions of the relevant footnote to the Table of Frequency Allocations, subject
only to coordination as prescribed in Article N13A. The additional provision of this
footnote imposes a condition of non-interference which could lead to a request to
cease operation of a previously coordinated satellite system in the case where an
administration, despite having agreed to such a satellite system, puts into service or
merely plants a system that might receive harmful interference. Such a condition is
unacceptable to the above administration.
Protocol Statement No. 32, FiNAL AcTs, supra note 47, at 730.
71 Final Protocol art. No. 13a, FpiNA AcTs, supra note 47, at 725.
72 OTA SuavEY, supra note 6, at 98.
73 See supra note 77 for text of statement.
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74 OTA SURVEY, supra note 4, at 79, 83.
75 Id. at 98.
76 This reservation pertained specifically to the allocation of the HF band at 6 and 7 MHz.
The text is as follows:
In the view of the above-mentioned administrations (Saudi Arabia, Cyprus, Spain, the
United States, Greece, the United Kingdom, Sri Lanka, and Zambia) this conference
has failed to make adequate provision for the needs of the HF broadcasting service in
the revised allocations, particularly at 6 and 7 MHz. Unless authority is given to the
proposed HF Broadcasting Conference, by its agenda, for it to make use of some parts
of the spectrum allocated to the fixed service, that Conference will not be able to plan
all frequency bands to enable countries to sustain their broadcasting services in the
face of varying propagation conditions throughout the solar cycle. In the absence of
an adequate plan, the above-mentioned administrations reserve their right to take the
necessary steps to meet the needs of their HF broadcasting services.
Protocol Statement No. 36, FNAL AcTS, supra note 50, at 731.
77 Protocol Statement No. 38, the major reservation taken by the U.S. to WARC '79,
involved changes to the Table of Frequency Allocations:
The delegation of the United States of America formally declares that the United States
of America does not, by signature of these Final Acts on its behalf, accept certain
decisions taken by this Conference in regard to the Table of Frequency Allocations and
the associated footnotes, and therefore, the United States of America:
1. In view of the fact that this Conference has failed to provide adequate allocations
for the HF broadcasting service, particularly at 6 and 7 MHz, reserves on this matter
as indicated in a separate statement made jointly with the delegations of Saudi Arabia,
Cyprus, Spain, Greece, the United Kingdom, Sri Lanka, and Zambia;
2. Reserves the right to operate stations in the mobile satellite service in the frequency
range 235 to 399.9 MHz as indicated in a separate statement made jointly with the
delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Iceland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and
Turkey;
3. In the operation of stations in the radiolocation service on a primary basis in the
bands of 430-440 MHz, 5 650-5 850 MHz, 8 500-8 750 MHz, 8 850-9 000 MHz, 9 200-9
300 MHz, 9 500-9 800 MHz, 10 000-10 500 MHz, 13.4-14 GHz, 15.7-17.3 GHz, and
33.4-36 GHz, cannot guarantee protection to or coordination with other services;
4. Reserves the right to operate stations of the fixed, mobil, and radiolocation services
on a primary basis in bands as specified in the footnotes pertinent to frequency bands
470 - 806 MHz and 890 - 960 MHz, without the condition specified in these footnotes
that make such operations subject to agreement under Article N13A. The United States
will coordinate its usage of such services with neighbouring administrations which are
affected;
5. In view of the fact that the Conference failed to provide adequate allocations for
the HF maritime mobil service, particularly below 12 MHz, states its intention to
satisfy maritime mobile requirements in the several HF bands below 10 MHz allocated
to the mobile service on a primary basis.
FINAL Acts, supra note 50, at 731.
78 The first two parts of Protocol Statement No. 38 restated statement nos. 36 and 32
respectively. Id.
79 Radiolocation, commonly known as radar, is very difficult to operate with other
systems without causing harmful interference with those systems. However, non-industrial-
ized nations do not use radar extensively. Therefore, those nations proposed to share or
operate radiolocations along with other radio services, like mobile radio systems and fixed
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radio systems. The U.S. objected on national security grounds because the effectiveness of
Department of Defense radar units would have been undermined. See WARC '79 Hearings, supra
note 1, at 27 (statement of William Cook, Department of Defense).
80 Protocol Statement No. 38 para. 3, supra note 77.
81 id. at para. 4.
82 Id. at para. 5.
83 See WARC '79 Hearings, supra note 1, at 32 (statement of Sen. Harrison Schmitt, New
Mexico). Senator Schmitt was also troubled that planning for the future use of the spectrum
and geostationary satellite orbits was postponed until later ITU conferences. Id. at 33.
84 Speech by Senator Schmitt to the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International
Studies, at 3-4 (undated). The manuscript was supplied to the author by Senator Schmitt's
office.
85 Id. at 4.
86 S. 2181, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. Rac. 6477 (1982). The amendments also called
for a review of the structures, procedures and mechanisms used by the U.S. in developing
telecommunications and information policy.
87 The text of Senator Schmitt's proposal is as follows:
Resolved (oo-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein ),
That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of The Radio Regulations
(Geneva, 1979) and a Final Protocol signed on behalf of the United States at Geneva,
December 6, 1979, with several reservations, subject to the following proviso:
(a) that in the implementation of this treaty for the United States, the introduction of
a Direct Broadcasting Satellite Service into the 12.2-12.7 GHz band shall be carried out
in a manner which minimizes unreasonable disruptions to existing uses in that band;
(b) that the United States undertake, expeditiously, a reorganization within the Execu-
tive Branch (including revision of Executive Order No. 12046) to ensure the effective
coordination of United States international telecommunications policy, particularly
the development of long-range goals and specific strategies to meet those goals.
Id.
88 S. 2181, supra note 86.
89 Id.
